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This paper interrogates a key feature of anarchist education; focusing on a problem 
with implications not only for anarchist conceptions of education, but for anarchist 
philosophy and practice more broadly. The problem is this: if anarchism consists 
in the principled opposition to all forms of coercive authority, then how is this to 
be reconciled with situations where justice demands the use of coercion in order to 
protect some particular good? It seems that anarchist educators are forced to deny 
coercive authority in principle, whilst at the same time affirming it in practice. This 
is the paradox of pedagogical authority in anarchist education. Coercive authority 
is simultaneously impossible and indispensable. Exploring this paradox through a 
reading of Jacques Derrida’s later work, and, in particular, his conception of justice 
as requiring openness to the singular situation (Derrida, 1990), I argue that in 
exercising their authority anarchist educators encounter the aporetic moment in 
anarchism, experiencing what Derrida calls ‘the ordeal of the undecidable’ (Ibid.). 
Understood this way, the paradox becomes less an indication of anarchism’s 
limitations than it does its value. For it is here that the problem of pedagogical 
authority is treated with the gravity that all questions of justice deserve. 
Keywords: anarchism; authority; pedagogy; Derrida. 
Introduction 
 
There is not in the world a truer object of pity, than a child terrified at every glance, and 




This paper interrogates a key feature of anarchist education; focusing on a problem with 
implications both for anarchist conceptions of education and for anarchist philosophy 
and practice more broadly. The problem is this: if anarchism consists in the principled 
opposition to all forms of coercive authority, then how is this to be reconciled with 
situations where justice demands the use of coercion in order to protect some particular 
good? It seems that anarchist educators are forced to deny coercive authority in 
principle, whilst at the same time affirming it in practice. This is the paradox of 
pedagogical authority in anarchist education. Coercive authority is simultaneously 
impossible and indispensable. I explore this paradox through a reading of Jacques 
Derrida’s later ethical work, and, in particular, his conception of justice as requiring 
openness to the singular situation (Derrida, 1990). To be open to singularity is to accept 
the burden of responsibility for taking decisions on an uncertain ethical terrain; a terrain 
in which there are no clear guidelines for action. This is the route down which the 
anarchist pedagogue travels. In exercising her authority, she encounters the aporetic 
moment in anarchism, experiencing what Derrida calls ‘the ordeal of the undecidable’ 
(Ibid.).  
The paper begins by sketching anarchism’s core commitments and surveying 
anarchist approaches to education. Then, drawing on two case studies – Escuela 
Moderna and Paideia – I trace the paradoxical aspects of anarchist education and detail 
how an engagement with Derrida’s later work throws fresh light on its contradictions. I 
argue that the paradox is inescapable and to evade it is to relinquish responsibility for 
justice. The challenge for anarchist educators is to remain sensitive to this aporia and 





Anarchism: a brief sketch 
Anarchism is about freedom and equality. It is about empowering individuals and 
communities to take direct control of their own affairs without the intervention of 
political intermediaries. Its goal is the creation of a just, egalitarian social order based 
on voluntary association, mutual aid, and direct democracy; a social order, that is, 
without hierarchy, without authority, and without the state.  
Central to anarchism is the problem of authority (McLaughlin, 2007). Decried 
by Bakunin as that which anarchists ‘detest with all our heart’ (Bakunin, 1970, p. 28), 
authority, with its connotations of hierarchy and control, is antithetical to anarchist 
goals. Anarchists do not, however, reject authority tout court. For, as Bakunin observed, 
there are occasions when we rightfully appeal to the authority of others. The authority 
deriving from specific expertise for example. ‘In the matter of boots,’ he writes, ‘I refer 
to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that 
of the architect or the engineer’ (Ibid., p. 32). Here, though, the individual retains her 
‘incontestable right of criticism and censure’ (Ibid.). She is free to heed the bootmaker’s 
advice or ignore it. Instead, it is ‘fixed, constant, and universal authority’ (Ibid., p. 33) 
that anarchists reject; authority that is imposed upon individuals and demands 
obedience. It might be suggested that anarchists recognise the legitimacy of what has 
been termed theoretical authority, authority in knowledge and belief, whilst disclaiming 
practical authority, authority over conduct (Steutel & Spiecker, 2000). However, this 
distinction is ambiguous. The authority claimed by religious leaders, for instance, often 
comprises authority over belief and conduct. Just as the teacher is expected to be an 
authority where knowledge is concerned and in authority in matters of classroom 
discipline (Peters, 1966, p. 240). Anarchists focus instead on the criterion of coercion. It 
is coercive authority they repudiate – ‘the power or right to compel the compliance of 
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another against her will’ (Jun, 2012, p. 113) – whether concerning beliefs, conduct, or 
some combination of both. 
The core conviction that ‘all forms of coercive authority are morally 
condemnable’ (Jun, 2010, p. 51), shapes anarchism’s axiological and normative 
commitments. Its axiology, encompassing liberty, equality, and solidarity, is 
complemented by a normative dimension comprising an overarching commitment to a 
principle of anti-authoritarianism. What is right for anarchists, what people ought to 
do, is refrain from engaging in any activity that unduly limits the liberty of others or 
encourages/sustains oppressive social practices. Indeed, anarchism is unthinkable 
without such a commitment. These norms and values scaffold a prefigurative ethic. If 
the goal is to establish an egalitarian, horizontal social order, in which coercive 
authority, hierarchy, and inequality have been eradicated, then the practices adopted by 
anarchists, including education, must be consistent with this end.  
 
Anarchism, Authority, and Education 
There is a long history of anarchist involvement in education (Suissa, 2010): including 
notable schools (e.g. Louise Michel’s International School (1890-93), Francisco 
Ferrer’s Escuela Moderna (1901-06), and Sébastian Faure’s La Ruche (1904-17)); the 
early twentieth-century Modern School movement (Avrich, 2006); and anarchist 
contributions to the Free Schools of the 1960s/70s (Shotton, 1993). More recently, 
anarchist pedagogies have been revived in Europe and the USA (Shantz, 2010; 
Haworth, 2012; Haworth & Elmore, 2017) and small pockets of anarchist schooling 
persist (Fremeaux & Jordan, 2012). Libertarian schools, such as Summerhill, moreover, 
whilst not consciously anarchist, also reflect anarchist ideals (Gribble, 2012). 
5 
 
Education has special import for anarchists. It is considered vital for social 
renewal and provides an arena in which mutual aid and direct democracy can be 
prefiguratively practised (Mueller, 2012). Many anarchists recognise that dismantling 
existing power structures is not sufficient for securing social change; instead, 
environmental conditions must be established in which sociability rather than egoism 
can prevail. A process of ‘moral enlightenment’ is required (Kropotkin, 1970, p. 102). 
People must be educated in principles and practices of mutual aid, for without the 
requisite degree of moral development antisocial tendencies may triumph. Education 
should hence be geared towards fostering and developing desirable forms of moral 
conduct, prefiguring utopian visions of the society to come.  
Essentially, anarchist education is about eradicating coercive authority to allow 
people to develop freely according to their own interests and inclinations, whilst 
practising self-government and mutuality. As James Guillaume envisaged: 
 
No longer will there be schools, arbitrarily governed by a pedagogue, where the 
children wait impatiently for the moment of their deliverance when they can enjoy a 
little freedom outside. In their gatherings the children will be entirely free. They will 
organize their own games, their talks, systematize their own work, arbitrate disputes, 
etc. They will then easily become accustomed to public life, to responsibility, to mutual 
trust and aid. The teacher whom they have themselves chosen to give them lessons will 
no longer be a detested tyrant but a friend to whom they will listen with pleasure. 
(Guillaume, in Bakunin, 2002, p. 373-4) 
 
Coercive authority is inimical to this endeavour because it is fundamentally 
asymmetrical, vesting one party with exclusive power to compel obedience from the 
other, thereby narrowing the scope of free action and foreclosing any prospect of 
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mutuality. Although many commentators conceptualise authority as founded in consent 
and regard coercion as a particular species of power (Peters, 1966; Steutel & Spiecker, 
2000; Wilson, 1992), this distinction is difficult to maintain. It is not simply that power 
and authority often blur in practice (Haynes, 1987), but that authority itself represents a 
formally sanctioned configuration of power-relations that licences coercion. 
Authority is always authority over something or someone. This differential 
allocation of capacities and constraints firmly situates authority within the ambit of 
power, understood as ‘the ability of an actor or set of actors to constrain the choices 
available to another actor or set of actors in a non-trivial way’ (Allen, 1998, p. 33). The 
distinctiveness of authority lies in its formalisation of power-relations in a fixed, 
hierarchical model underscored by official sanction, but its legitimacy derives from the 
normative framework in which it operates (legal, moral, bureaucratic, etc.) and only 
indirectly from the putative consent of those subject to it. Nor does the simple fact of 
obedience automatically indicate acknowledgement of an authority’s legitimate right to 
command, as Steutel and Spiecker (2000) suggest. One is subject to authority 
irrespective of whether one approves. Indeed, a person may consider an authority 
illegitimate but faced with the likely repercussions of disobedience comply nonetheless. 
In such cases, we plausibly consider that person coerced; the chief motive for 
compliance being the prospect of further sanction. But to describe this as an instance of 
‘mere’ power rather than authority is to ignore the fact that imposing sanctions is the 
prerogative of authority; it is only by virtue of their status as authorities that authorities 
are able to marshal the power to secure compliance. Those subject to authority have 
little choice but to submit. Coercion is certainly not exclusive to authority, and it is not 
always necessary, but it is indissociable from it. 
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Authority is better understood as a form of ‘situated social power’ deriving from 
an agent’s position within a structured set of relationships which determines ‘the 
“relative positioning” of social others’ (Wartenberg, 1992, p. 88). Here, a person’s 
powers are linked directly to their status: the teacher has the authority to detain students 
after school, whereas school nurses do not. To function, these powers require ‘[a]n 
entire set of social practices […] be coordinated in very specific ways’, since ‘in the 
absence of such an alignment, the power of an agent will be severely limited’ 
(Wartenberg, 1992, p. 90, 91). Authority offers one such alignment, formally 
coordinating power relations to constrain possibilities for free action. And where such 
constraints are considered illegitimate, we rightly speak of coercive authority.  
Anarchists seek to eliminate coercion from education settings by reconfiguring 
pedagogical practices and relationships. The anarchist pedagogue is no longer entitled 
to compel and coerce. Instead, education becomes grounded in mutuality as a practice 
of freedom. There is a deeper issue here, however, that troubles the anarchist 
educational project. Genealogists of education have persuasively documented the 
centrality of educational institutions to ‘the modern play of coercion over bodies, 
gestures and behaviour’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 191). Presented as a ‘benign violence’ 
(Allen, 2014), education, with its attendant hierarchies and divisions, its principles, 
moralities and constraints, is condemned ‘as an extensive, invasive form of 
governmentality’ (Peim, 2013, p. 182); a pervasive technology for moulding citizens’ 
souls. As a governmental technology, education is all the more effective, it is argued, 
since coercive methods have been supplanted by, or at least articulated with, techniques 
for managing and manipulating the conscience of subjects (Hunter, 1994, p. 73; 
passim). On this account, education is unredeemable and even radical educational 
experiments are complicit with its logic. Efforts to expunge power and authority from 
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the classroom only serve to intensify regulation of pupils’ bodies and behaviours 
(Hunter, 1994). This issue is taken up below, but first I further develop the account of 
anarchist education by drawing on two exemplary case studies: Francisco Ferrer’s 
Escuela Moderna and Paideia, a small anarchist school in south-western Spain.  
 
Escuela Moderna (1901-1906) 
Francisco Ferrer is the pre-eminent figure in anarchist education. Not least because his 
ideas spawned a movement in education across Europe and North America in the early 
twentieth-century (Avrich, 2006; Shotton, 1993). Ferrer keenly opposed ecclesiastical 
or political control of education. Under their influence, he lamented, the school had 
‘become one of the most powerful instruments of servitude in the hands of the ruling 
class’, dominating ‘children physically, morally, and intellectually, in order to control 
the development of their faculties in the way desired’ (Ferrer, 1913, pp. 48-9). The 
Escuela Moderna, conversely, was conceived as a ‘rational school’, opposed to 
dogmatism and devoted to ‘the purpose of preparing children for their entry into the free 
solidarity of humanity’ (p. 60). Imbued with moral purpose, the school sought to 
regenerate society by liberating children from authority and by fostering the moral 
sensibilities necessary for forging an egalitarian social order. As Ferrer commented, the 
‘sole ideal’ of educators should be ‘the training of a generation fitted to establish a 
really fraternal, harmonious, and just state of society’ (p. 59). The young were to be 
instructed in ‘sound social duties’, there would be no violence or punishment, and 
everything would aim at ‘peace, gladness, and fraternity’ (p. 15, 59). Co-education of 
genders and classes was the norm, and children were free to develop according to their 
inclinations. Teachers would not impose dogma or demand submission. Whereas ‘[t]he 
teacher is always imposing, compelling, and using violence,’ Ferrer maintained, ‘the 
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true educator is the man [sic.] who does not impose his own ideas and will on the child, 
but appeals to its own energies’ (p. 51). This opposition between libertarian and 
authoritarian pedagogies is a recurring trope across anarchist education.   
 
Paideia (1978-present) 
Similar principles drive Paideia, an overtly anarchist school currently celebrating its 
fortieth anniversary. As reported by Fremeaux and Jordan (2012), Paideia ‘is 
fundamentally rooted in the notion that anarchism must be experienced’ (p. 108. 
Original emphasis). An experiment in living, students are collectively responsible for 
running the school in collaboration with teachers/adults. The emphasis is on self-
government, autonomy, and responsibility. Every aspect of the school is managed 
without relying upon coercive authority, and, as with Escuela Moderna, moral 
development is of fundamental importance. Anarchist values are ‘central to the life and 
learning of the school’ (Ibid.). These values – equality; justice; solidarity; freedom; 
nonviolence; culture; happiness – are practised daily and steer the educational process: 
 
Paideia does not see the process of growing up free as something passive. It is not a 
relaxed laissez-faire attitude where children can simply do whatever they want while 
the educators remain impassive and value free. It is instead a dynamic exercise, which 
involves creating a working community that is held by a set of clear values and where 
the rights of educators and students are acknowledged as equal. (Ibid.) 
 
The idea of establishing a self-governing community is thus a key feature of school life. 
The authority of the pedagogue recedes in the face of the freedom, independence, and 
autonomy of pupils; replaced by mutuality between adult/child. As Fremeaux and 
Jordan conclude, ‘[f]or the pedagogues of Paideia, freedom is an active process, it is the 
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art of developing personalities who have an uninhibited sense of volition embedded 
within acute consciousness of self and connection to the other’ (p. 121).  
 
Power and Pedagogy  
These examples highlight the moral agenda driving anarchist education. They also 
demonstrate how anarchists seek to reconfigure pedagogical relationships by 
substituting authority for freedom and mutuality. This does not mean, however, that 
power plays no part in anarchist schooling. The pedagogical relationship is itself a 
power-relation (Foucault, 1980, p. 187). Even in its most libertarian guise it inevitably 
involves unequal partners and, as Hunter (1994) argues, the governing of conduct and 
behaviour. To adopt a deliberate programme for directing the conduct of children is to 
use power proactively to produce a set of desired outcomes; to order, arrange, and 
structure the pedagogical environment. Herbert Read (1944, p. 24), for instance, urged 
that education be founded on freedom and trust precisely to ‘establish the precepts of 
mutual aid’. Just as Bakunin (2002, p. 95) advocated inculcating humanist values to 
create the moral beings of the future. In both cases the exercise of power is apparent.  
The concerns raised by genealogists of education point to contradictions in the 
anarchist educational project. Despite denouncing traditional education as controlling 
and constraining, and for promoting conservative values, both Paideia and Escuela 
Moderna effectively serve as moral laboratories for engineering social subjects. In 
neither case is a laissez-faire approach adopted, instead concerted efforts are made to 
direct and steer conduct for ends, and using means, deemed desirable. A similar 
governmental logic thus cuts through both libertarian and authoritarian alternatives. It 
may be, then, that anarchist education is demanding the impossible. Whilst it recasts 
education in a more ‘user-friendly architecture’ (Peim, 2013, p. 193), it nevertheless 
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consolidates invasive governmentality. However, beyond an appeal to the originary 
freedom of the child to create itself ex nihilo, it is difficult to see how education, or 
child-rearing for that matter, could meaningfully dispense with processes of person-
formation, key as they are to socialisation and enculturation. Moreover, from the 
standpoint of ethical and political assessment, it is the means and ends of government 
that matter, not governmentality per se. Anarchist education might thus be construed as 
a necessary impossibility; an opening gambit in a longer ‘anarchistic struggle’ to 
overturn dominant strategies for the ‘governmentality of individualization’ and 
‘promote new forms of subjectivity’ (Foucault, 2002, p. 330, 336). The crucial issue, 
addressed later in relation to coercive authority, centres on deciding where, to what 
extent, and in what way government should be exercised.  
Another tension emerges from this anarchist governmentality that has direct 
bearing on the issue of coercive authority: is there a morally significant distinction 
between instilling and inculcating, on one hand, and imposing and compelling on the 
other? The latter, after all, typify the kind of coercive practices anarchists eschew. 
Ferrer (1913, p. 56), for one, insists that ‘the faculties of the children shall develop 
freely without subjection to any dogmatic patron’, but even he maintains that,  
 
[O]ur business is to imprint on the minds of the children the idea that their condition in 
the social order will improve in proportion to their knowledge and to the strength they 
are able to develop; and that the era of general happiness will be the more sure to dawn 
when they have discarded all religious and other superstitions, which have up to the 
present done so much harm. (Ibid., p. 65. Author’s emphasis) 
 
This suggests a double movement: the explicit rejection of dogmatic indoctrination and 
an equally explicit effort to mould character for ends perceived just. Viewed 
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unfavourably, this may appear no less indoctrinating. However, if indoctrination 
constitutes the intention to teach someone to believe something regardless of the 
evidence (Snook, 1972), then the charge might be deflected on the grounds that the 
Escuela Moderna prioritised self-learning within a system based on rational inquiry and 
scientific observation. Although, ‘[t]he teacher must implant the germs of ideas’, the 
aim was to develop ‘solid minds, capable of forming their own rational convictions on 
every subject’ (Ferrer, 1913, p. 20). Moreover, given that all education systems transmit 
values there is nothing peculiar here about anarchist education. The moral framework of 
anarchist education is perhaps more suggestive of an ‘initiatory pedagogy’ rather than a 
concerted programme of indoctrination (McDonough, 2011). 
Nevertheless, this issue speaks to the nature of pedagogical power outlined 
above. Power functions in the educational environment by fostering particular moral 
perspectives. Transmitted indirectly through pedagogical practices and behaviours, it 
operates in the liminal space between the authoritarian pedagogue’s ‘imposition’ and 
the libertarian pedagogue’s ‘imprinting’. But whereas impositions coerce and compel, 
the pressure exerted by imprinting does not foreclose possibilities for independent 
agency, it merely guides that agency in specific directions. So, whilst both processes 
involve power, imprinting is more akin to influence than coercion and hence does not 
betoken the paradox in anarchist thought. Anarchist governmentality in the sphere of 
education does not compromise the commitment to resisting coercive authority. What is 
worthy of further attention, however, is the practical necessity of coercion and its 
incompatibility with the normative content of anarchism.  
 
The Paradox of Pedagogical Authority 
13 
 
If anarchism promotes ‘freedom for everybody and in everything, with the only limit of 
the equal freedom for others’ (Malatesta, 1965, p. 53), then what action is rightly taken 
in cases that infringe upon this rule? Picture the following scene: Jonny doesn’t get 
along with the girls in his class. When they are working, he disrupts them. When they 
are speaking, he interrupts them. He has even taken to insulting the girls using 
misogynistic slurs. The teacher has reasoned with Jonny, thoroughly explaining the 
injustice of gender discrimination, and his peers have explained how his actions have 
affected them. And yet, despite this, his behaviour persists.  
What is the anarchist pedagogue to do? Perhaps Jonny could be isolated from 
the class or have his access to certain activities restricted. Or, if his behaviour continues 
unabated, perhaps he could be removed from the school entirely. Each option involves 
coercion. Jonny likes the school. He doesn’t want to be excluded or isolated from his 
friends. But justice may demand exactly that. And herein lies the problem. Whilst it 
appears to contravene the ‘ethical core’ of anarchism, coercion may be necessary and 
just and the pedagogue compelled to exercise authority coercively to protect the liberty 
and interests of the wider group.  
One can imagine other scenarios in which this problem emerges for the anarchist 
pedagogue, but Paideia provides a concrete example of the issues at play. Paideia 
emphasises self-government and freedom for pupils, but there are times when a state of 
exception is declared, when normal conventions are suspended, and authority is 
exercised coercively. On such occasions, pupils are placed under Mandado – which, 
roughly translated, means ‘to be ordered’ – where power is transferred exclusively to 
adults/teachers (Fremeaux & Jordan, 2012, p. 109). At root, Mandado is a punishment; 
a procedure for correcting aberrant behaviour. However, the Mandado is noteworthy not 
simply for involving coercion, but for the recognition that the governing principles of 
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the school, for a time at least, must be suspended. In other words, there is an 
acknowledgement of the paradoxical nature of anarchist pedagogy; recognition that the 
Mandado contravenes basic anarchist principles.  
Scope clearly exists for authority to function coercively in anarchist educational 
settings. Indeed, it may be justifiable and necessary. There is something paradoxical, 
then, about anarchist pedagogy. In principle, coercive authority is impossible, but in 
practice it is inescapable. In the interests of justice, anarchists are compelled to both 
deny and affirm coercive authority. This stems from the recognition that sanctions can 
be enabling as well as disabling. To impose a sanction constrains an individual’s scope 
of action and infringes liberty, but at the same time it can serve to protect the liberty of 
the wider group and hence represent a just course of action.  
With what certainty, though, can we be assured that any given exercise of 
authority is just? To refrain from exercising authority may give rise to injustice; but, 
mechanically exercising authority, as a matter of course, may prove equally unjust. For 
Chomsky (2005) this involves determining the legitimate use of power. Anarchism, he 
suggests, places the burden of proof on authority. The difficulty lies in deciding whether 
and when this burden has been met. The gravity of this decision and its implications for 
justice can be approached by considering Derrida’s later work, which throws the 
paradox of anarchist education into sharper relief, revealing it as a necessary aporia with 
which anarchists must perpetually engage. 
 
Derrida and ‘The Ordeal of the Undecidable’ 
Throughout his work from the late 1980s onwards, Derrida demonstrates that key 
concepts in our ethico-political vocabulary are inherently aporetic. In Force of Law this 
is cashed out in terms of the complex relationship between justice and law. Law, 
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Derrida contends, is of the order of the regular and the calculable. It constitutes ‘a 
system of regular and coded prescriptions’ that can be mechanically applied in all 
instances and to all particular cases (Derrida, 1990, p. 959). Conceived in these terms, 
however, law and justice are by no means equivalent. On the contrary, ‘if the act simply 
consists of applying a rule, of enacting a program or effecting a calculation,’ Derrida 
writes, ‘we might say that it is legal, that it conforms to law, and perhaps, by metaphor, 
that it is just, but we would be wrong to say that the decision was just’ (Ibid., p. 961). 
This is because justice is not the mere application of a rule; a rule that would treat all 
instances equally the same. Justice resists any such codification. It consists in an 
openness and responsivity to the singular situation; it ‘always addresses itself to 
singularity, to the singularity of the other, despite or even because it pretends to 
universality’ (Ibid.). Or, as one of Derrida’s commentators puts it, ‘[d]oing justice to the 
case at hand involves an ‘unconditional’ moment of an attention to singularity that is 
precisely not governed by rules, but utterly open to the future’ (Fritsch, 2011, p. 457). 
Norms, rules, laws, etc., function in the register of calculability, of judgements 
and decisions enacted in accordance with statutory principles backed up by force (for 
there is no law, Derrida insists, without enforceability – ‘law is always an authorized 
force’ (1990, p. 925)).  But if law is ‘the element of calculation,’ justice, on the other 
hand, ‘is incalculable’ (Ibid., p. 947). The singularity of the situation, the interruption of 
the singular other, exceeds the scope of calculation. It is impervious to rule, regulation, 
and even reason. The distinction between law and justice, between the calculable and 
the incalculable, is not, however, an absolute distinction between two exclusive terms, 
for this would not constitute an aporia. Rather, the aporia consists in the fact that justice 
and law, though contradictory, nevertheless require one another. As Derrida (Ibid.) 
writes, ‘it turns out that droit [law, right] claims to exercise itself in the name of justice 
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and that justice is required to establish itself in the name of a law that must be 
“enforced”’ (pp. 959-61). Without justice, we might say, law remains arbitrary, and 
without law, justice is impotent.  
This means there are never any guarantees where justice is concerned. Whilst we 
may be confident we have acted in full conformity with the law, the same cannot be said 
for justice. For unlike law, ‘the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a 
rule’ (Ibid., p. 947). Indeed, all such assurances vanish when confronted by the singular 
situation. If justice was simply a matter of applying a pre-existing rule to the situation at 
hand, there would no longer be scope for freedom or responsibility, as the decision 
would have been ordained in advance (Derrida, 2005a). The decision qua decision can 
never follow automatically from one’s fidelity to some moral schema, since that would 
divest oneself of the burden of responsibility and deprive the situation of its singularity. 
Instead, it operates on an uncertain terrain; a terrain marked by the ‘experience and 
experiment of the undecidable’ (Derrida, 1988, p. 116. Original emphasis). What 
Derrida highlights here is the decidedly undecidable nature of all decisions. There is no 
finality to be had in matters of justice. The moment of decision is interrupted by 
experience of the undecidable, of an incalculable and immeasurable demand for justice. 
Hence Derrida’s insistence that ‘[t]here can be no moral or political responsibility 
without this trial and passage by way of the undecidable’ (Ibid.). 
For Derrida, there is no responsibility or justice without passage through ‘the 
ordeal of the undecidable.’ The situation always demands a response. A decision must 
always be taken even if on uncertain terrain. It is a thin line that must trodden in 
dealings with justice. We are simultaneously confronted with the singular situation 
(requiring experiment and invention, to reinvent the rule in each case) and the 
obligation to resist the dangers of the worst, the most perverse forms of calculation. And 
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it is here, in walking this line, ‘in this ‘obligation’ to calculate the incalculable, that the 
‘ordeal’ of the undecidable is undergone’ (Gormley, 2012, p. 395). Indeed, it is the 
gravity of having to decide on uncertain terrain, without any assurances or guarantees, 
that marks out the ‘ordeal of the undecidable’ as an ordeal, as a particularly trying 
experience. 
 
The Aporetic Moment in Anarchism 
The Derridean account of the ordeal of the undecidable and the aporetic structure of 
justice throws the situation faced by the anarchist pedagogue into sharper relief. If we 
return to the principle of anti-authoritarianism specified earlier – people ought to refrain 
from engaging in any activity that unduly limits the liberty of others or which 
encourages and sustains oppressive social practices – it serves as an unstable 
foundation for moral judgement in anarchist thought. The caveat ‘unduly’ is significant: 
we ought not to engage in any practice that unduly (i.e. unjustifiably or inappropriately) 
limits another’s liberty. This suggests that whilst calculation is required – we have to 
gauge, assess, and work out whether infringing another’s liberty is just – we can never 
be certain that we have calculated correctly. It is impossible to be certain whether the 
response is proportionate to the infringement or that due consideration has been paid to 
the singularity of the situation. There comes a time when we must intervene, when we 
have to act, but the decision taken is never guaranteed in advance; unease, doubt, and 
anxiety persist. This is the ‘ordeal’ in the ordeal of the undecidable. Nothing can be 
taken for granted. Actions must be submitted to rigorous scrutiny without any 
pretension that justice has finally been served. By doing so we remain sensitive to the 
situation, committing ourselves on an undecidable moral terrain that is always already 
marked by caveats. If the pedagogue could simply default to an anarchist codex, some 
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exhaustive list of statutes drawn up for regulating school-life down to the minutest 
detail, then no difficulty would arise in the first place, since, as Derrida recognises, the 
decision would have already been determined from the outset. 
This discussion highlights the aporetic moment in anarchist education and 
anarchist philosophy more generally. It draws attention to the inseparability of norms 
and sanctions, and the implications this has for anarchist thought and practice. For 
whenever we speak of social norms, we also invoke corresponding sanctions, since 
without the possibility of being held to account for breaching accepted standards, the 
latter would appear bereft of motivational force. As far as anarchism is concerned, the 
aporia consists in the fact that even though anarchists are ostensibly opposed to all 
forms of coercive authority, some degree of coercion (in the form of sanctions 
proscribing certain behaviours) is nevertheless required to protect and preserve core 
anarchist principles, such as a respect for ‘the equal freedom of others.’ How these 
sanctions are formulated and executed, though, remains a delicate topic.   
The problem of authority in anarchism is unavoidable because anarchists are 
caught between opposing and yet requiring some degree of coercive authority. To 
redress the violence of an injustice, or to prevent injustice arising, it may be necessary 
to impose punitive sanctions. This is the aporetic moment in anarchism. Freedom and 
authority reject and require one another. There is a tension between the need to enforce 
the authority of anarchist norms and the countervailing commitment to opposing force, 
authority, and coercion in the name of freedom. Again, the role of the anarchist 
pedagogue is that of the funambulist; she must walk the tightrope between these two 
positions, negotiate the fraught path between combatting authority in the name of justice 
and combatting injustice with authority. The task is to remain sensitive to this aporia, to 
the challenge posed by having to act without any certainty or guarantees. Anarchy in 
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this sense, like Derrida’s conception of justice and democracy, is always ‘a venir,’ 
always ‘to come.’ The ordeal of the undecidable with respect to pedagogical practice is 
one we must continually face, it is indicative of the thin line to be trodden in doing 
justice to justice. This task will not be painless – ‘It must be difficult to judge and to 
decide. A decision worthy of the name – that is, a critical and reflective decision – could 
not possibly be rapid or easy’ (Derrida, 2005b, p. 15) – but that is precisely what makes 
the ordeal an ordeal. It is in this light that the paradox of pedagogical authority in 
anarchist education should be approached. The normative dimension of anarchism is an 
unstable, undecidable structure, a guidepost suggesting, but never dictating, the 
direction of travel. It helps inform our calculations as to what decisions to take and 
which judgements to make, but without any pretensions that those decisions are 
conclusive or that justice has been definitively served. 
 
Conclusion 
There is a paradox at the heart of anarchist education. Pedagogical authority is 
impossible and yet indispensable. It is incompatible with the axiological and normative 
framework of anarchism and at the same time indispensable. It should not, however, be 
seen as a sign of a fundamental and fatal flaw in anarchist thought. For as an 
engagement with Derrida’s later ethical work has shown, the aporia in anarchism is a 
productive one. It speaks to the seriousness with which anarchists treat matters of 
justice. Indeed, on this reading, the paradox becomes less an indication of anarchism’s 
failings than it does its value; for it is here that the exercise of pedagogical authority is 
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